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 1 Introduction
 The opinion that a group of states that share 
history, geography, political views, tradition and culture 
are more likely to enjoy a shared understanding of 
human rights was initiated by the United Nations General 
Assembly to call upon states to establish “regional 
arrangements” to promote and protect human rights.1 
The goal was to provide remedies in the absence of ones 
at the national level or where such national mechanisms 
are inadequate or do not provide the necessary redress. 
One of the regions attempting to make such efforts is the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) through 
the establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental 
Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) in 2009, 
which aims to promote and protect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the ASEAN region.2 
1 Resolution 41/153, 1986 on Regional Arrangements for the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in the Asian and Pacific 
Region.
2 Terms of Reference of ASEAN Intergovernmental 
Commission on Human Rights, Article 6.8.
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 While regional human rights regimes have been 
in operation for some time in Europe, the Americas and 
Africa, in Southeast Asia such a regime has been absent. 
Despite setting a new stage for rights development in the 
region (Nugroho, 2013) since its establishment in 2009, 
the AICHR has not fully functioned as a regional human 
rights mechanism that meets civil society’s expectations.
 The AICHR itself has been seen to focus only on 
promotion and not on actively protecting individuals 
whose rights have been violated or on addressing past 
wrongs (Mathew, 2014). One of the reasons is that the 
Term of References (TOR) of the AICHR provides no 
explanation on how exactly the AICHR protects human 
rights in ASEAN. The dialogue on human rights in 
ASEAN3 expresses the ineffectiveness of the AICHR to 
provide protection to the people of Southeast Asia.4  The 
AICHR and ASEAN member states are thus called on to 
significantly improve the human rights commission in 
order to strengthen its protection mandate to benefit all 
people in the region. 
 As a normative study using a statute and conceptual 
approach, the analysis of this chapter is divided into three 
parts. Part I will address the ineffectiveness of the AICHR 
by providing  evidence on ASEAN’s failure in addressing 
human rights violations and abuses committed by state 
parties, such as crimes against the Rohingya and other 
religious and ethnic minorities in Myanmar, enforced 
disappearances, extra-judicial killings in the Philippines 
attacks on the independent media, dissolution of the legal 
3 The high level dialogue was organised by Asian Forum for 
Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA), ASEAN Parlia-
mentarians for Human Rights (APHR) and Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS).
4 Report from Asian Forum for Human Rights and Develop-
ment, ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights, Joint Statement: 
ASEAN needs a stronger Human Rights Mechanism, May 10 2019.
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opposition and the shrinking of the civic space and freedom 
of expression in the region. The situation is deteriorating, 
but all issues remain unaddressed by the AICHR. The 
question is why? Therefore, Part II analyzes the view 
of human rights in the region where the universality of 
human rights is denied, prioritizing the national interest 
of each member state through different interpretations 
of the limitations of human rights. Such differences may 
weaken the establishment of the mechanism, however in 
Part III, it is argued that a cultural perspective could help 
complete the system through a method of interpretation.
 2 The Ineffectiveness of the System
 From 2010 to 2019, there  were no significant 
improvements in human rights made through the activities 
of the AICHR to protect the people of ASEAN. The human 
rights situation in the region  has been deteriorating, but all 
the issues remain unaddressed by the AICHR. To describe 
the physiognomy of human rights in Southeast Asia, the 
term ambivalence has been used (Muntarbhorn, 2002). 
There are many factors that contribute to this,  such as 
substantive and procedural factors. There are three factors 
regarding the limitations of the substantive factors. 
 First is the the narrow interpretation of the 
principle of sovereignty and nonintervention (Jati, 
2017). In Southeast Asia, human rights and international 
supervision by human rights mechanisms have always 
been viewed as a threat to the sovereignty of the state 
and therefore considered a domestic issue (Caballero-
Anthony, 1995). AICHR representatives strongly adhere 
to the principle of noninterference (Hsien-Li, 2012) where 
there is a high degree of respect for the right of every 
member state to lead its national existence free from 
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external interference, subversion and coercion. According 
to many Southeast Asian states, no one can dictate or 
make judgments on others about human rights, and 
the international community has no right to intervene, 
including the AICHR. Indeed, the deeper regional 
integration is, the more vulnerable ASEAN member states 
are to exposing their domestic affairs to each other and 
the world. Being open is a constitutive implication of 
regional integration. This , however, scares some countries 
in ASEAN as they will be the subject of international 
criticism (Wahyuningrum, 2014). In relation to this, 
ASEAN member states have been reluctant to engage 
in direct confrontation with the United Nations (UN), 
stressing national sovereignty and protesting western 
dominance in the UN (Eldridge, 2002). Furthermore, 
several ASEAN governments have also criticized the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights because many 
member states were not yet independent and therefore 
had no part in its formulation (Gai, 1995).
 Second is the limitations of human rights that are 
incompatible with international human rights instruments. 
Limitations of human rights are also regulated in the 
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (ADHR). Similar 
to other regional human rights charters,5  the exercise 
of human rights and freedoms can be limited by law for 
the purpose of securing the recognition of human rights 
and the freedom of others, which meet the requirements 
of national security, public order, health, public safety, 
morality as well as the general welfare of the peoples of 
a democratic society.6  However, while international 
law subjects such limitations to three strict tests, the 
condition of legality, legitimacy and proportionality, this 
5 Such as the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 
and The European Convention on Human Rights.
6 ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, Article 8.
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is not the case in ASEAN. Moreover, different from other 
international human rights instruments, the AHRD does 
not apply this restriction to a selective number of rights, 
but to every right.
 Third is the lack of determination to ratify core 
treaties. The ASEAN family is divided into two groups 
on the issue of human rights. Indonesia, Malaysia the 
Philippines and Thailand are positively more open to 
human rights and norm change. They have ratified many 
of the core international human rights treaties, have 
national human rights institutions in place and in terms 
of democracy and development are not at the bottom of 
the scale. On the other side is Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar 
and Vietnam, a distinct group in which the standard of 
living, GDP, human rights and standards of rule-based 
governance are substantially below other ASEAN member 
states (Jones, 2008). Brunei and Singapore are somewhere 
between the camps (Koh, 2008). Despite that the TOR 
of the AICHR clearly states that ASEAN member states 
are encouraged to accede and ratify international human 
rights instruments,7  there is a lack of determination among 
them. Among all 10 members, only Indonesia, Cambodia 
and the Philippines have adopted all major international 
human rights treaties.8
 In the view of establishing a regional human 
rights regime and improving human rights standards, 
7 Terms of Reference of ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on 
Human, Article 4.5
8 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); 
International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(ICERD), Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW); Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC); Convention on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers 
(CMW), Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CPRD) and 
Convention on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
(CPED).
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ratification of international human rights treaties is a 
critical factor (Hashimoto, 2004) because it displays a 
prima facie acceptance to international human rights 
norms. However, mere ratification is no guarantee for 
acceptance or implementation of international human 
rights norms. The above table may give us an idea of the 
national interest of each state through its way to consent to 
be bound to certain international conventions. Moreover, 
the substantive reservations to several conventions by some 
member states shows us the differences and nonuniform 
understanding and approach among ASEAN member 
states.
 On the other hand, there are also two procedural 
factors, namely the structure of the AICHR with a lack of 
independence and weak mandates for protection (Phan, 
2012).
 First, there is a lack of independence in the system. 
Any human rights mechanism requires independence 
from political organs, such as national government. 
This standard requirement should also apply to ASEAN 
through the AICHR. However, this is not the case given 
Figure 3.1. [ASEAN Member states Commitment to International Human 
Rights Law]
Key: - : (neither signed nor ratified); A: Accession; S: (signed but not ratified); 
R: (Signed and Ratified)
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that the AICHR is a consultative intergovernmental body.9 
Despite the need to be able to provide opinions and 
receive information independently from its constituent 
governments, as a consultative body the AICHR is 
structured in a way that functions to accommodate its 
close relationship with member states’ governments. 
This is problematic as the AICHR functions in a way that 
allows the promotion and protection of human rights to 
be influenced by the political will of its member states. 
The conflict of interest between the AICHR’s members, 
governments and victims of human rights abuses interferes 
with the AICHR’s impartiality when performing its duties.
 Second is the broad and weak mandates of the 
TOR. The ASEAN human rights regime mainly focuses 
on promoting human rights rather than protecting 
them (Beyer, 2015). Some argue that the mandates were 
formulated using the promotion first, protection later 
approach (Wahyuningrum, 2014), where it focuses more on 
the promotional aspect. So far, AICHR activities have only 
ranged from disseminations, workshops and discussions 
with stakeholders, namely governments, the people and 
NGOs. The Rohingya crisis, for example, was not touched 
on by the AICHR. Instead, environmental rights have 
been the focus for seminars and workshops in Myanmar 
(Arifin, 2016). The AICHR cannot move beyond this area. 
None of the stipulations in the TOR of the AICHR talk 
about the capacity to monitor human rights practices in 
ASEAN member states, such as the power to investigate, 
monitor or enforce.  
 The AICHR does not provide a protective 
mechanism in receiving complaints from individuals or 
groups (Muntarbhorn, 2013). That is why the AICHR has 
not actively been involved in dealing with in human rights 
9 Terms of Reference of ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission of 
Human Rights, July 2009, Article 3.
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violations in the region. The case of the mistreatment of 
the Rohingya in Myanmar has been one of the examples 
where ASEAN and especially the AICHR have been 
criticized for being unable to fully address the continuation 
of human rights violations in the region (Gamez, 2017). In 
other words, the AICHR fails to recognize the concept of 
the responsibility to protect. The summary of the factors, 
both substantive and procedural, that contribute to the 
ineffectiveness of the ASEAN human rights system can be 
seen in the table below.
 
 On the other hand, while some core international 
human rights treaties have been signed by some ASEAN 
member states, implementation remains poor (Aguirre & 
Pietropaoli, 2012).
 3 The Interpretation of Cultural Relativism  
 in Southeast Asia
 The debates on the universalism versus the cultural 
relativism of human rights are dominated by two schools 
of thought (Steiner, Alston, & Goodman, 2007). The main 
question of the debate between the extremes is whether 
cultural adjustments are needed to legitimate human 
rights action, or that this cultural diversity would form a 
threat to the effective guarantee of universal human rights 
Figure 3.2. [Contributing Factors to the Ineffectiveness of the ASEAN Human 
Rights System]
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standards (Addo, 2010). The first school supports the idea 
that human rights are universal, i.e. that they apply to 
all human beings regardless of race, color, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status (Tomuschat, 2008), 
and that all human beings are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights.10 The second school claims that human 
rights are not universal (Tharoor, 2000), but rather can 
be differentiated on the grounds of national and regional 
particularities.11  This concept of cultural differences 
challenged the dominant paradigm of universal human 
rights by positing a differential and hierarchical philosophy 
of rights directly in opposition and offering an alternative to 
Western hegemonic rights values (Jones, 2014). Therefore, 
cultural relativity intends to weaken the very universality 
of human rights. As there is no universal culture, in 
consequence there is no universally valid standpoint on 
any moral issue. Furthermore, because human rights are 
moral entitlements, they cannot have a universal quality, 
but must vary according to the cultural environment in 
which they originate and function (Davidson, 2001). 
 The majority of Southeast Asian countries, despite 
being parties to the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,12 -- all of which 
recognize and uphold the principle of universality -- 
clearly support the cultural relativism school of thought. 
This is closely related to the discourse of “Asian values”. 
10  Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 Article 1.
11 Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World 
Conference on Human Rights, Bangkok, 17 December 1991, para 8 (Bangkok 
Declaration).
12 See Figure 3.1, ASEAN Member states Commitment to Interna-
tional Human Rights Law, p.4.
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The concept of specific Asian values is often used as a 
reason or even a legitimation as to why Asian states do 
not adopt human rights. In essence, Asian values have 
been used to promote cultural relativism as an argument 
against the universality of human rights. Cultural 
relativism, embodied in the notion of Asian values, has 
often been used as an argument to dismiss the western 
concept of democracy and human rights as  unsuitable for 
the Southeast Asian context (Mauzy, 1997).
 Evidence of this can be found in the text of several 
legal documents. Through the Bangkok Declaration,13 
Asian countries ‘recognize that while human rights are 
universal in nature, they must be considered in the context 
of a dynamic and evolving process of internal norm-
setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and 
regional particularities and various historical, cultural and 
religious backgrounds.
 Similarly, the TOR of the AICHR states that:
 
 
 This position was reconfirmed by the secretary-
general of ASEAN at an international event in 2010, stating 
that (Pitsuwan, 2010):
 
 The AHRD adopted in November 2012, which 
saw international criticism toward its culturally relativist 
aspect (Clarke, 2019), also mentioned that:14
13 The Bangkok Declaration 1993, Article 8.
14 ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, Article 7.
1. “To promote human rights within the regional context, bearing in mind 
national and regional particularities and mutual respect for different 
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds, and taking into account the 
balance between rights and responsibilities.”
“I think we have to go back to the very fundamental concept of individual 
rights and human rights where I think the two traditions, East and West, have 
some fundamental differences. I am saying this not arguing that we do not have 
universal norms for human rights. I’m just saying that universal norms are being 




 The AHRD requires that individual rights be 
balanced by corresponding duties, which is used as a 
tactic to impose restrictions on rights and freedoms.15 
Furthermore, the instruments recognize that human rights 
and freedoms can be conditioned by measures designed 
to uphold national law, national security, public order, 
public health, public safety and public morality,16  without 
subjecting these measures to tests of legality, legitimacy 
and proportionality.   The legal provisions 
above along with public statements show the paradox of 
universal human rights in ASEAN, which is recognized 
as universal in principle but particular in application. 
They are frequently cited to illustrate the cultural relativist 
stance, or situational uniqueness, of Asian governments 
when it comes to human rights. This limits the universal 
implementation of human rights in favor of cultural 
interpretations. In other words, ASEAN promotes and 
protects human rights and fundamental freedoms as long 
as they do not contradict the history, politics, religions or 
economic context of the member state in question. 
 The rights of ASEAN’s peoples must be 
compromised so as to conform to a particular history, 
political system or set of development goals (Bui, 2016). 
While some argue that the establishment of a human 
rights system in ASEAN is slow, one may see this through 
a different view using the so-called margin of appreciation 
doctrine.
15 Ibid, Article 6.
16 Ibid, Article 8.
“At the same time, the realization of human rights must be considered in the 
regional and national context bearing in mind different political, economic, legal, 
social, cultural, historical and religious backgrounds.”
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 4 The Cultural Necessity to Establish a  
 Human Rights System
 The establishment of a human rights system will 
not be effective without a human rights court. Courts 
may offer effective enforcement of human rights in line 
with regional needs, experiences and legal traditions. 
In Southeast Asia, the need for a human rights court to 
promote legally enforceable human rights is crucial. 
One  issue is the ASEAN Charter shows a lack of a clear 
enforcement mechanism and that there is no provision 
for suspension or expulsion of members who do not 
comply with the Charter. Furthermore, the purpose of the 
AICHR to protect human rights seems to have lost its way 
because it lacks an institutional framework in the region. 
But even if the protection mandates of the AICHR were 
strengthened, it still could not replace to role of a court 
because only courts are able to provide legally binding 
decisions. Thus, while commissions might offer remedies, 
the establishment of a court is needed to provide effective 
and enforceable remedies.17 
 Much has been discussed by scholars on the 
necessity of a court to complete the human rights system 
in ASEAN, including the improvements needed to 
accommodate such a court. In this regard, it is important 
to note that localized circumstances such as cultural 
differences, religious traditions, economic development 
and the nature of legal and political institutions makes 
implementation effective and enforceable only when it 
finds support in localized and regional particularities. 
However, these differences have caused a lack of a uniform 
approach to interpret human rights norms among ASEAN 
member states. Other regional particularities also face this 
17  Ibid, p.143
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situation. In Europe, it is impossible to find a uniform 
European stance on moral issues to guide the human rights 
court’s interpretations (Peerenboom, 2006). Taking this 
into consideration, the important question is what about 
ASEAN? How will the court in Southeast Asia interpret 
human rights? Does using cultural aspects undermine a 
universal standard? To analyze this, one might look into the 
application of international law principles and standards 
within ASEAN, as well as the application of cultural 
values and differences through the margin of appreciation 
doctrine and how this could affect the interpretation of 
judges in a future Southeast Asian human rights court.
 
 5 ASEAN Human Rights Standards
 The international community adopted the Vienna 
Declaration and Program of Action (VDPA), which 
was endorsed by all states, including ASEAN member 
states. States affirmed unreservedly that the universal 
nature of all human rights and fundamental freedom 
was beyond question. They agreed that it was the duty of 
states, regardless of their political, economic and cultural 
systems, to promote and protect all rights and freedoms. 
This declaration was widely seen as having firmly rejected 
the contention of a very few that human rights are relative 
in nature. This was one of the key aims of the Vienna 
Declaration: to forge a new vision for global action 
on human rights into the next century. Yet the AHRD 
attempts to undo the Vienna consensus by requiring that 
human rights be conditioned on regional and national 
particularities. ASEAN member statesgenerally guard 
sovereignty and cultural relativity specific to each member 
state. This fragmented positioning was represented in the 
AHRD and AICHR negotiations leading up to the AHRD 
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(Jones, 2017), through the so-called Asian ways or values. 
 The use of Asian ways or values in the AHRD can 
be seen as a specific form of cultural relativism. Asian 
values was a term devised by several Asian leaders and 
their supporters to challenge civil and political freedoms 
of a Western style (Bauer & Bell, 1999). However, the 
Asian way is seen as a fatally flawed document where 
scholars and experts argued that it undermined rather 
than reinforced universal standards (Ilona, 2012). 
Several major flaws include:18 (a) imposing overarching 
limitations and conditionality on the enjoyment of rights; 
(b) subjugating rights to national laws; (c) a restricted and 
excluding provision for nondiscrimination; (d) failure to 
protect the rights of specific groups; and (e) provisions for 
specific rights that are vague, weak or otherwise fall below 
international standards. 
 While the VDPA did express that the significant 
different backgrounds should be borne in mind, it does 
not impose any obligation to consider human rights in 
regional or national contexts. On the contrary, it stressed 
that it was the duty of states, regardless of their political, 
economic or cultural systems, to promote and protect 
all human rights and fundamental freedoms. Under 
international law ASEAN member states have the duty, 
regardless of their political, economic or cultural systems, 
to respect and protect all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.19 
 Furthermore, international law allows certain 
rights to be subjected to limitations only under specific 
and narrowly defined situations. For example, under the 
18 Civil Society Joint statement, ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 
must not provide protections lower than international human rights law and 
standards,  Sept. 13 2012; See also Report from UN Human Rights Council, 
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration should Maintain International Standards, 
Nov. 16 2012
19 The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, Questions and Answers, 
International Commission of Jurist, July, 2013
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ICCPR, to which 167 states are party to, including six of the 
10 ASEAN member states, only a few rights are subjected 
to such limitations. These include freedom of movement, 
freedoms of association, expression and peaceful 
assembly and freedom to manifest one’s religion. But even 
limitations on these rights are subject to tight conditions 
of necessity and proportionality: they must be strictly 
necessary for protection of national security, public order, 
public health or morals or to protect the rights of others. 
The AHRD extends that all rights have the possibility to be 
limited, even those that are absolute under international 
law, such as freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment and punishment. Rather than 
applying a condition of strict necessity, principle 8 merely 
states that limitations have to be imposed for the purpose 
of meeting the just requirements of national security and 
other purposes. The declaration, unlike the ICCPR, allows 
for limitation on the bases of general welfare of people 
in a democratic society. This category is so broad that it 
could be interpreted to encompass almost all state activity. 
This was also emphasized by the Human Rights Council 
experts where restrictions may not put in jeopardy the 
right itself or apply to rights that are non-derogable under 
international law. 20 However, Southeast Asian countries 
continue to support the cultural relativism approach.
 6 Cultural Necessity and Margin of 
Appreciation 
 Differences in interpretation on human rights 
among states exist based on the sovereignty of each state. 
However, it is important to analyze how states could meet 
20 Report from UN Human Rights Council, ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration should Maintain International Standards,  Nov. 16 2012
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the international standard, at least as a minimum standard, 
if there is any. How could it be evaluated? And to what 
extent is it legitimate? To mediate this issue requires the 
margin of appreciation doctrine.
 The margin of appreciation is a doctrine or key 
concept in determining whether limitations upon human 
rights are necessary in a democratic society. This doctrine 
is designed to provide flexibility in resolving conflicts 
emerging from diverse social, political, cultural and legal 
traditions of contracting states within the European context 
(Bakircioglu, 2007).  It seeks to balance the primary of 
domestic implementation with supranational supervision 
(Baik, 2012). It is applicable in the absence of a uniform 
European conception of the implications of the convention 
(De Schutter, 2010). Member states enjoy a certain margin 
of appreciation in asserting whether and to what extent 
differences in otherwise similar situations justify different 
treatment in law, with European supervision embracing 
both the law and the decisions applying it. Under this 
doctrine, the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR), there is a realistic judicial self-
restraint in recognition of the obligation to respect within 
certain bounds, the cultural and ideological variety, as 
well as  the legal variety characteristic of Europe (Steiner 
& Alston, 2000). In addition, the margin of appreciation 
doctrine has been transplanted to the jurisprudence of 
other international human rights mechanisms, such as the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights. 
 Hence, it allows states to have a measure of diversity 
in their interpretation of human rights treaty obligations. 
The doctrine refers to the latitude that national authorities 
enjoy in evaluating situations and the provisions of the 
ECHR.  It is also approved as the minimum standard by 
the member states of the Council of Europe, which have 
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more or less common traditions of democracy and human 
rights. The margin of appreciation doctrine has been 
developed to find the right balance between the national 
approach to human rights and the uniform application of 
the values of the ECHR.
 In response to the explanation above, Asian states 
do not take uniform stances toward morally controversial 
issues framed as human rights issues. The issue of capital 
punishment, for example, differs, where Thailand, 
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia retain the death penalty, 
while the Philippines and East Timor have abolished it. This 
is evidence of the lack of general consensus that is necessary 
to support customary international legal norms. This sharp 
divergence in matters implicating public morality is to be 
expected in a plural world. The margin of appreciation 
leaves a matter to the domestic deliberation of contracting 
states where little or no common ground exists between 
them with respect to sensitive issues. This stems from the 
cultural, historical and philosophical differences of these 
states. In a more diverse global setting, a global margin of 
appreciation may be deployed to manage politicized rights 
claims in acknowledging fundamental value divergences 
and the importance of pluralism, democratic politics and 
subsidiarity (Thio, 2018). 
 Southeast Asia needs to have a regional human 
rights court, the jurisdiction of which is to assess whether 
member states apply the so-called Asian values enshrined 
in the ADHR proportionately in pursuit  of international 
human rights law (Rachminawati, 2014). ASEAN can 
nonetheless retain an analogous margin of appreciation. 
Article 8 acknowledges the margin of appreciation by 
requiring human rights be exercised with due regard to 
the human rights and fundamental freedoms of others.21 
21 Thus the margin of appreciation doctrine allows states a certain 
measure of discretion in such instances. See J. Brauch, The Margin of 
Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: 
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The scope of the margin of appreciation depends on the 
nature of the rights in question. The scope becomes wider 
where there is no consensus among member states as to 
how a particular right should be protected in a particular 
situation,  as well as where important state interests are 
at stake. In this way, the margin of appreciation offers a 
way of mediating between the need to protect human 
rights and the need to respect state concerns about loss 
of sovereignty, particularly in relation to critical issues 
such as national security. To balance national sovereign 
concerns against regional supervision of human rights, 
the European experience provides nuanced lessons for 
Southeast Asia, as greater attention is paid there to working 
out the interaction between sovereignty and the external 
human rights mechanism (Saul, 2011).
 7 Conclusion
 Both substantive (the narrow interpretation 
of sovereignty and the principle of nonintervention, 
the limitations of human rights incompatible with 
international human rights instruments and the lack of 
determination to ratify core human rights treaties) and 
procedural factors (the lack of independence in the human 
rights system as well as the broad and weak TOR of the 
AICHR) contribute to the ineffectiveness of the ASEAN 
human rights system. 
 While several international conventions on 
human rights have been signed and ratified by  ASEAN 
member states, the implementation of those rights and the 
responsibility assigned in the conventions remain poor. 
Furthermore, while recognizing the universality of human 
Threat to the Rule of Law, 2005, Columbia Journal of European Law; A 
Legg, The Margin of Appreciation in International Human Rights Law, 2009
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rights, the interpretation among ASEAN  member states 
continues to be based on cultural relativism, meaning that 
the promotion and protection of human rights are based 
on aspects such as history, culture and religion. However, 
to complete the human rights system in the region, the 
establishment of a human rights court is necessary. Thus, 
there is a need to set a standard that is agreed on by the 
member states.  As there is an absence of such an agreed 
standard, the margin of appreciation doctrine initiated 
by the ECHR could be a basis to interpret human rights 
according to conditions in Southeast Asia. 
 Regarding the human rights commission, the 
AICHR needs to make major institutional changes and 
take genuine steps toward fulfilling the promises behind 
its establishment. The AICHR should actively devise 
methods and strategies to be the human rights standard-
setting institution of ASEAN. If the standard is based on 
cultural necessity, then the region needs to have a common 
baseline on how human rights in the AHRD are defined, 
interpreted and implemented. The use of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine may be an alternative way to resolve 
the standard  that can contribute and accelerate the 
development of ASEAN’s human rights system. However, 
further research on this matter needs to be done. 
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